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Russell is often said to have shared with Frege a distinctively “universalist”
conception of logic.1 This supposed feature of his view is commonly taken
to mark a deep contrast with contemporary conceptions of logic, and to be
something from which important consequences flow. But although the uni-
versalist interpretation has been widely endorsed, its precise content remains
elusive, and its accuracy, consequently, open to question.2 One sign of this
elusiveness is the proliferation of glosses on the claim that for Russell “logic
is universal.” Some commentators have meant by this that for Russell logic
is a “universally applicable theory,”3 others, that it constitutes a “universal
language,”4 still others, that its laws are “maximally general truths,”5 or that
its principles are “all-encompassing.”6
Given such a wide variety of glosses, one has to wonder whether there
can really be a single, unitary conception at which they all aim. If not, one
wonders which of these characterizations, if any, latches on to something im-
portant and interestingly distinctive in Russell’s way of thinking about logic.
The present essay is an attempt to investigate these questions. Its method
will be to try to tease out the various ideas touched on in these glosses and
to compare the results with Russell’s actual statements and commitments.
Although the investigation is primarily historical, a number of substantive
issues will be at stake: What are the prospects for using a conception of logic
as “the body of maximally general truths” as a way of demarcating this sci-
ence? Is it true, as some commentators have claimed, that universalism about
logic carries with it a commitment to the unintelligibility or impossibility of
metalogical theorizing?7 In what sense, if any, ought logic to be conceived
of as “the most general of the sciences”? My immediate goal in addressing
these questions will be to arrive at a clearer view of Russell’s conception of
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logic at the time of developing his logicism, but the discussion should be of
interest to anyone who has been struck by the thought that logic is, in some
special way, general.
The main conclusions of the essay will be negative. I will argue that once
the various slogans are made precise the appearance that Russell has an inter-
estingly distinctive “universalist” conception of logic in Principia Mathemat-
ica (hereafter “Principia”)—one, that is to say, which distinguishes his view
from more contemporary conceptions of logic by appealing somehow to its
special generality—simply evaporates. To be sure, there are some (disparate)
senses in which Russell might be said to count as a universalist in certain of
his other writings, but these, it turns out, are more qualified than has been
supposed, and have none of the deep consequences claimed for universalism.
In particular, contrary to what is often claimed, Russell’s universalism—such
as it is—carries no commitment to the unintelligibility or impossibility of
metalogical theorizing.
1. Logic as “Universally Applicable”
It will be useful to begin by disposing of a red herring. Russell himself once
offered a characterization of logic that might be thought to be broadly sugges-
tive of universalism in one of its guises.8 In his 1901 essay, “Recent Work on
the Principles of Mathematics,”9 Russell says that “Logic is, broadly speak-
ing, distinguished by the fact that its propositions can be put into a form in
which they apply to anything whatever” (1993c, 367). He means, first, that
the propositions of logic can be expressed in a form that brings out their
feature of “applying to everything,” and, second, that being so expressible
is one of their distinguishing marks. To illustrate the first of these points,
consider the logical law that Quine in his Methods of Logic (Quine 1982)
would express by means of the statement that the schema “p⊃(q⊃p)” is valid
(i.e., true on all interpretations of its sentence–letters). The counterpart of
this law on the Principles’s conception of logic is a Russellian10 proposition
whose “apparent variables”11 range over all “terms” in Russell’s technical
sense (discussed below). To be specific, it is the proposition expressed by the
sentence: [1] “If x implies x and y implies y, then x implies (y implies x)”12
(cf. Principles § 18). Here, “implies” is not a sentential connective but a rela-
tional expression that expresses a relation relating one entity, x, to another
(not necessarily distinct) entity, y, just in case both are propositions and x
is false or y is true. Accordingly, “x implies y” is false when either of x and
y is not a proposition, and so [1] is true even though it speaks not just of
propositions but of every “term” there is.
Although it is stated in a popular essay, the view that the notion of uni-
versal applicability can be used to demarcate the propositions of logic seems
to have been one that, for a while at least, Russell took seriously; for it is also
found in a draft of part I of the Principles from May 1901 (1993c, 187). It is
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absent, however, from the final version of that work, and, to my knowledge,
makes no subsequent appearance in Russell’s writings. Russell’s change of
heart would seem to have been well-advised,13 for the system of the Princi-
ples contains two logical axioms that, far from being universally applicable,
are not even general in nature. These are the axioms—or “primitive proposi-
tions” in Russell’s parlance—stating that class membership and implication
are relations (Principles § 30).14 Moreover, some of the propositions that in
the Principles Russell regards as speaking of “all . . . imaginable terms” (Prin-
ciples § 77) are not propositions of logic. One example is the proposition:
“∀x (x is a man implies x is mortal)” (ibid.). So Russell’s actual practice in
the Principles suggests that he regards “universal applicability” as neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for being a proposition of logic.
Might it at least be said that on the Principles’s conception of logic the
laws of logic are “universally applicable” in virtue of containing only variables
that range without restriction over everything there is?15 Strictly speaking,
the answer, once again, is “no.”
First, it is clear that even as early as the Principles Russell does not have
a universalist conception of the variable as such, since he regards some vari-
ables as essentially restricted. He says: “The notion of the restricted variable
can be avoided, except in regard to propositional functions, by the introduc-
tion of a suitable hypothesis, namely the hypothesis expressing the restriction
itself. But in respect of propositional functions this is not possible. The x in
ϕx where ϕx is a propositional function, is an unrestricted variable; but the
ϕx itself is restricted to the class which we may call ϕ” (Principles, § 88,
emphasis added). This circumstance is owed to the fact that not all propo-
sitional positions are open to any term. For example, in the propositions
Othello is jealous, and Othello loves Desdemona, Othello and Desdemona oc-
cupy positions open to any term, while what Russell calls the “adjective” is
jealous and the relation loves occupy positions open respectively only to adjec-
tives and dyadic relations. Thus the variables in “∀ϕ (ϕ Othello ⊃ ϕ Othello)”
and “∀R (Othello R Desdemona ⊃ Othello R Desdemona)” are restricted to
only some of the terms there are. In consequence, contrary to Hylton (1990,
202), for Russell in the Principles some logical propositions—for example,
“∀ϕ∀x (ϕx ⊃ ϕx)” and “∀R∀x∀y (xRy ⊃ xRy)”—do contain some restricted
variables.16
Second, although Russell does view (some of) the variables that occur in
the laws of logic as “unrestricted” in the sense that they range over every
term or entity, this does not—surprising as it may seem—entail that they
range over everything in his ontology. One could be forgiven for supposing
otherwise, for Russell’s formulations strongly encourage just such a view. He
says that the variables occurring in the laws of logic have “an absolutely
unrestricted field” (Principles § 7), and that “any conceivable entity may be
substituted for any one of [his] variables” (ibid.).17 If one did not know that
in the Principles “entity” is a term of art, one would naturally take Russell to
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be saying that the variables in the laws of logic range over everything in his
ontology. But “entity” is a term of art: Russell uses it synonymously with the
technical expression “term,” which applies to anything possessing the kind
of unity that renders it one definite thing (Principles § 47). And, crucially, the
ontology of the Principles is not restricted to “terms.” It also includes some
“objects” that lack the unity or definiteness of terms. This point is made in a
somewhat neglected footnote. In retraction of his far more celebrated claim
that “term” is “the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary” (Principles
§ 47), Russell says: “I shall use the word object in a wider sense than term, to
cover both singular and plural, and also cases of ambiguity, such as ‘a man’”
(Principles § 58, footnote). Perhaps because Russell goes on to say that the
fact that a word can be framed with a wider sense than “term” gives rise to
“grave logical problems” (Principles § 58, footnote), commentators have not
been inclined to give this remark much weight. Nonetheless, there are good
reasons to think it must be taken seriously. These reasons cannot, however,
be explained without some consideration of three further terms of art from
the Principles, namely: “proposition,” “denoting concept,” and “denoting.”
On the conception of the Principles, a “proposition” is not a sentence but
a complex of worldly entities—in the strict Russellian sense of “entity” (i.e.,
“term”)18—that has a kind of unity which renders it capable of being true
or false. Whereas sentences express propositions, their component words—
with certain exceptions19— express propositional constituents. Thus Russel-
lian propositions can contain as constituents concrete individuals as well as
abstracta. They can also contain entities akin to certain kinds of Fregean
senses, namely, so–called “denoting concepts.” These are the propositional
constituents expressed by the six “denoting phrases”: “all F ’s,” “every F ,”
“any F ,” “an F ,” “some F ,” and “the F .” (Here “F” is a singular common
noun and “F ’s” its plural form. Russell uses italics to indicate that he is
referring to a denoting concept rather than expressing one.20 So he would
say, for example, that the denoting phrase “all F ’s” expresses the denoting
concept all F ’s.)
A central plank of the Principles’s conception of the proposition is the idea
that propositions are about certain of their constituents. A subject-predicate
proposition, for example, is—as a rule—about the entity that occupies its
subject–position, and a relational proposition is about its relata. More gen-
erally, a proposition is—as a rule—about those entities that occupy its uni-
versally term-accessible positions. The exception to this rule occurs when
the term that occupies a universally term-accessible position is a denoting
concept. In such cases, what the proposition is “about” is not the denoting
concept itself but the object it denotes. Finally, although the relation of de-
noting is in the first instance a relation between a non-linguistic entity—the
denoting concept—and the object it denotes, a denoting phrase can also be
said to “denote” in a less fundamental sense: it denotes the object denoted
by the denoting concept it expresses.
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With these basic points about the Principles’s theory of “denoting” in
place, it is possible to see why Russell is committed to holding that “object”
has a wider extension than “term.” First, consider the case of objects that
do not qualify as terms because they are “plural.” Russell takes denoting
phrases of the form “all F ’s” to have as meanings denoting concepts that de-
note objects which he calls “classes as many” (Principles, ch. 6, passim). Such
classes include finite conjunctions of terms such as William and Mary, as well
as infinite conjunctions of terms, whose specification, Russell thinks, is a log-
ical but not psychological possibility (see Principles § 71). These “numerical
conjunctions,” or “collections” as Russell sometimes calls them (Principles
§ 130), are essentially plural: William and Mary are not one thing but two.
It follows that when a denoting phrase of the form “all F ’s’” occurs in a
meaningful sentence there must—so long as the propositional function x is
F is true of more than one thing21—be a certain plural object—a “class as
many”—to be its denotation. More generally:
There is . . . a definite something [in the case of each of the denoting concepts all
men, every man, any man, a man and some man], which must, in a sense, be an
object, but is characterized as a set of terms combined in a certain way, which
something is denoted by all men, every man, any man, a man or some man; it is
with this very paradoxical object that propositions are concerned in which the
corresponding concept is used as denoting. (Principles § 62)
Not all of these “paradoxical objects” are classes as many, but the one de-
noted by all men certainly is. The ontology of the Principles, therefore, con-
tains objects that are not terms.
The second category of objects that are not terms (or entities) comprises
what Russell calls “cases of ambiguity.” What he has in mind are the deno-
tations of denoting concepts expressed by denoting phrases of the form “any
F” (cf. Principles § 61). Russell takes these denotations to be variables:
We may distinguish what may be called the true or formal variable from the
restricted variable. Any term is a concept denoting the true variable; if u be a
class not containing all terms, any u denotes a restricted variable. (Principles,
§ 88)
To get a feel for the Principles’s—admittedly curious—conception of the vari-
able, one needs to keep in mind that for Russell at this stage, on those (rela-
tively few22) occasions when he is speaking strictly, the variable x is neither
the letter “x” nor the propositional constituent it expresses, but rather the
denotation of that propositional constituent. This conception is evident in
Russell’s remark that: “[A variable] is not the concept “any member of the
class,” but it is that (or those) which this concept denotes” (Principles § 332).
Russell also maintains that the propositional constituent expressed by the
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letter “x” has the same denotation as the denoting concept any term (cf.
Principles, § 93). And, importantly for our purposes, that denotation is an
intrinsically indefinite object. As Russell puts it: “x is not one definite term”
(Principles, § 88, emphasis added). Since it is a defining trait of a term to be
one, it follows that the variable is not a term at all. Thus Russell is led by his
conception of the variable to include in his ontology a second kind of object
that is not an “entity” or “term.”
To complete the argument that on the Principles conception of logic even
the “unrestricted” variables occurring in the laws of logic do not range over
everything in Russell’s ontology, it only remains to show that these variables
range only over all the terms (or entities) there are, rather than the wider do-
main of objects. That idea is suggested—but not conclusively established—by
two facts about how Russell speaks in the Principles: first, he never character-
izes the unrestricted variable as ranging over all “objects” but only as ranging
over all “entities” or “terms;” second, when he lists the logical constants in-
volved in the notion of formal implication he speaks of “any or every term”
rather than “any or every object” (Principles § 106, italics in the original.). The
idea receives more conclusive support from reflection on Russell’s conception
of instantiation. On that conception, the result of instantiating a variable is
a proposition containing the relevant value of the variable as a constituent.
But, crucially, Russell maintains that “Every constituent of every proposition
can be counted as one” (Principles § 47).23 In consequence, neither Russell’s
“classes as many” nor his “indefinite objects” may instantiate Russellian vari-
ables. The upshot, surprising as it may seem, is that Russell is committed to
denying Quine’s adage that “to be is to be the value of a variable.”
At this stage, the objection might be raised that the present interpreta-
tion is pragmatically inconsistent, since one of the theses just attributed to
Russell—namely, that some objects are not terms—quantifies over all objects
without restriction. The objection, however, is easily turned aside. The thesis
in question does quantify over all objects, but it doesn’t quantify over them
by using a variable. Instead it employs the denoting concept expressed by
the denoting phrase “some objects.” In consequence, it would not be self-
defeating for Russell to maintain that some object is not in the range of his
variables.
A more serious difficulty for Russell—but not for our exegesis of him—
concerns the denotation of the denoting phrase “any object.” As we have
seen, Russell maintains that the denoting phrase “any term” denotes the
unrestricted or “true” variable, which ranges over all terms (Principles § 88).
One might suppose that correspondingly “any object” must denote a variable
ranging over all objects whether singular or plural. But, as we have seen, for
Russell there can be no such variable, and “any object” accordingly, cannot
have a denotation. It is therefore unclear how to assign truth conditions
to propositions containing the denoting concept any object. That, however,
cannot be a criticism of the present interpretation, for, as Russell himself
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acknowledges in “On Denoting,” the Principles’s theory of denoting gets into
difficulties (among other things) because of non-denoting denoting phrases.24
So the present difficulty is just an instance of a more general problem for
Russell’s so-called “first theory of denoting.”25
Returning to the main thread, we may note that the grain of truth in the
idea that in the Principles the variables occurring in the propositions of logic
are “wholly unrestricted” is that (some of them) range without restriction
over all terms—even if not over all objects. Later, in 1906, Russell gives an
argument against the intelligibility of restricted variables (Lackey 1973, 205),
and in the years from (late) 1905 to 1907, having apparently abandoned his
belief in objects that are not terms,26 he adopts a conception of the variable as
genuinely universal. However, upon the demise of the “substitutional theory”
to which Russell subscribes during these years, he abandons the unrestricted
variable and develops a system involving full type stratification.27
If the individual laws of logic are not, on Russell’s considered view, univer-
sally applicable, might he nonetheless have held that logic as a whole has this
character? This idea has been suggested by Alasdair Urquhart, who claims
that for Russell logic is a “universally applicable theory which covers all en-
tities, concrete or abstract” (1988, emphasis added). As it happens, this is an
accurate characterization of the system of the Principles since there “entity”
is a technical term, but it is less clear that it fits the system of Principia. One
might be tempted to think that the type-stratified logical theory of Principia
does “cover” all entities (now in the looser sense of “entity” equivalent to “an
item in Russell’s ontology”) because for anything at all there is a law of logic
that quantifies over it. But the temptation is better resisted, since the attempt
to formulate such a view involves precisely the kind of cross-type general-
ization that type stratification deems nonsensical. It is not, therefore, a view
that Russell or Whitehead could endorse as their considered position—or
even one they could, officially speaking, find intelligible.
Some advocates of the universalist interpretation have maintained that
Russell’s conception of logic differs from “the” modern one in conceiving of
logic as a body of truths as opposed to schemas. Peter Hylton, for example,
says: “The idea of logic as made up of truths already marks a difference
between Russell’s conception [of logic] and the modern one. The modern
logician sees logic as made up of a formal system which contains schemata
which are subject to interpretations, where each schema has a truth-value in
each interpretation. The crucial notion is thus truth in all interpretations or
validity. For Russell, by contrast, the crucial notion is simply truth” (Hylton
1990, 200). However, the attempt to draw a contrast on this point is confused.
The fact is that both Russell and “the modern logician” (who for advocates of
the universalist reading of Russell usually seems to be represented by Quine)
see logic as a body of truths. The real point is that these truths differ in their
content. Each sentence expressing one of Quine’s laws asserts the truth that
a schema is true on all interpretations, while each sentence expressing one of
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Russell’s asserts the truth that a propositional function is “always true.” The
grain of truth in Hylton’s remark is that Russell and Quine conceive of their
logical calculi differently. Whereas a line of a logical proof in one of Quine’s
textbooks will contain an uninterpreted schema, a line in a proof in Principia
will contain an interpreted formula. But while plausibly correct, this is a
point that should not be pressed too far. For one way of making sense of the
“typical ambiguity” of the formulas of Principia would be to regard them as
schemas awaiting an assignment of types. As Michael Potter has observed,28
that was in fact how Whitehead viewed them: He writes to Russell, “my view
is that our symbols remain mere unmeaning forms until the types of all the
variables are determined” (ANW to BR, 27 Jan. 1911, RA1 710.057409).
Two days later Whitehead spells out the point again: “According to me until
all ambiguities are definitely settled there is simply a sequence of meaningless
shapes” (ANW to BR, 29 Jan. 1911, RA1 710.057414). Russell didn’t share
Whitehead’s conception of typical ambiguity, but it is quite unclear that he
had a coherent alternative to put in its place.
Our first attempt to make sense of the supposed universality of Russell’s
logic has yielded only the relatively uninteresting result that in the Principles
Russell presents the laws of logic (but not every one of his axioms) as speaking
of every term or entity. Such a conclusion does bring out that the formulas
expressing Russell’s laws in the Principles are to be taken as generalizations
about worldy items—i.e., at this stage, individuals, propositional functions,
propositions and classes—rather than as metalinguistic statements asserting
the validity of certain linguistic schemas. And so it does highlight one point
of contrast with one modern conception of logic, namely, the view repre-
sented by Quine in Methods of Logic.29 But it does not really bring out an
interesting sense in which logic is “universal,” for the contrast between the
Principles’s conception of the laws of logic and Quine’s is not accurately de-
scribed by saying that a Russellian logical law speaks about everything, while
one of Quine’s speaks only about some more restricted class of things—viz.,
interpretations of a schema, for on both conceptions the laws of logic speak
only of some (more or less extensive) fragment of reality. Of course, there is
nothing wrong with using the phrase “universalist conception of logic” to
mean “non–metalinguistic conception of logic”; so this observation cannot
be taken to reveal an error on the part of those who would attribute “univer-
salism” to Russell on these grounds—it just reveals the lack of connection
between “unversalism” so understood and the idea of genuine universality.
If we seek a sense in which for Russell logic—early and late—does have
a prima facie claim to an extreme kind of generality, we shall have to try
another tack. A remark of Warren Goldfarb suggests two further ideas:
“Russell,” Goldfarb says, “took logic to be completely universal. It embodies
all-encompassing principles of correct reasoning. Logic is constituted by the
most general laws about the logical furniture of the universe: laws to which all
reasoning is subject” (1989, 27). This remark appears to contain two rather
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different ideas. The first is that logic for Russell is “all-encompassing” in the
sense that its laws are “laws to which all reasoning is subject”; the second—
shorn of its redundant “logical furniture” metaphor30— is just that logic is
constituted by laws that are the most general laws there are. The first idea
can be dealt with quickly, but the second merits an extended discussion.
2a. Logic as “All–Encompassing”
On the face of it, to maintain that “all reasoning is subject to the laws of
logic” is to hold that all good reasoning is logically valid reasoning. So,
according to Goldfarb’s first line of thought, logic is “universal” in the sense
that its principles are “all-encompassing”: they impose minimal conditions
on correct reasoning within any realm of inquiry whatsoever. This claim is,
in turn, ambiguous between a weaker and a stronger interpretation.
On the weaker interpretation, to say that the principles of logic are “all-
encompassing” is to say that once the non-logical axioms of any science have
been isolated and recorded as premises, all correct reasoning from this basis
is logically valid reasoning. Such a thesis stands opposed to the view—which
Russell attributes to Kant31—that Euclidean geometry makes an essential ap-
peal to irreducibly diagrammatic (hence logically invalid) modes of reasoning
(cf. Principles § 434). According to that view, in the proof of Euclid’s first
proposition—to take a familiar example—one “reasons” to the existence of
a point of intersection of two circles by constructing in intuition two circles
that intersect. The existence of the point of intersection does not follow log-
ically from Euclid’s axioms, but it does follow geometrically—or so, at least,
the Kantian would contend.32 To maintain that logic is “all-encompassing,”
on this weaker interpretation, is just to say that there are no such logically
invalid, yet mathematically cogent, modes of reasoning.
On the stronger interpretation, to say that logic is “all-encompassing”
means in addition to this that any principles of reasoning one might formulate
as a priori axioms are themselves ultimately logical in character (which is just
to say that they are grounded in logic and definitions). Such a thesis stands
opposed not only to the Kantian view of geometrical reasoning, but also to
any view that takes non-logically grounded a priori principles to belong to
the foundation of some science. It thus stands opposed to Frege’s view of
geometry in The Foundations of Arithmetic as well as to Kant’s (Frege 1884,
§ 89).
It is uncontroversial that Russell conceives of logic as “all-encompassing”
in the weaker of these two senses.33 But to the extent that this gloss on his
universalism is uncontroversial, it is correspondingly empty: if something as
widely accepted as the rejection of Kant’s views on the essentially intuitive
character of mathematical reasoning suffices to qualify someone as a “uni-
versalist” about logic, then it is hard to see why Russell’s universalism should
have been thought to render his view of logic interestingly distinct from more
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modern conceptions. On the other hand, it is doubtful that Russell held logic
to be “all–encompassing” in the stronger and more interesting sense. For
although he does take the principle of mathematical induction to be logi-
cally grounded, there are other a priori principles of reasoning that he does
not regard as reducible to logic. One well-known example is the principle of
empirical induction (1986, 37), which Russell deems “wholly a priori” (1986,
86) on the grounds that it is incapable of proof or disproof by appeal to
experience (1986, 37–8). A less familiar class of cases comprises statements
of comparative intrinsic value, for example, the principle that happiness is
more desirable than misery (1986, 42).
2b. Logic as “Maximally Generalized”
So much, then, for Goldfarb’s attempt to capture Russell’s alleged universal-
ism by appealing to the idea that all reasoning is subject to logical laws. Let
us turn now to his second suggestion, namely, that Russell holds logic to be
“universal” in the sense that its laws are the most general laws there are.34
This view receives some prima facie support from Russell’s post-1912 charac-
terizations of the propositions of logic as “completely general” (e.g., 1988b,
237), but it is hard to know how to gauge these characterizations until we
identify the relevant dimension of variation, and the nature of its supposed
upper limit.
It seems unpromising to treat logical laws as maximally general in virtue of
quantifying over more of reality than laws of any other kind, since it would be
hard to know why empirical laws—such as the fundamental laws of physics—
should not also be formulated using an “unrestricted variable.” An apparently
more promising way to build on Goldfarb’s suggestion would be to pursue
the idea that for Russell logic counts as a body of maximally general truths
because its propositions are in some sense maximally generalized. This idea
has recently been developed by Peter Sullivan (2000), who suggests, first,
that Russell subscribed to such a conception both in the Principles and in
Principia, and, secondly, that it is nonetheless in tension with his logical
practice in the latter work. Sullivan says:
When he wrote the Principles in 1903 Russell thought of logic as a science of
maximal generality, definable as “the class of propositions containing only vari-
ables and logical constants.” He wrote “So long as any term in our proposition
can be turned into a variable, our propositions can be generalized; and so long
as this is possible, it is the business of mathematics [and so of logic] to do it.”
Together these claims imply that the logical constants cannot be “turned into a
variable,” but why not?
In the Principles the answer turns on the fact that “variables have an absolutely
unrestricted field: any conceivable entity may be substituted for any one of our
variables.” A variable thus has no particular symbolic shape to it, so turning
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everything in a proposition into a variable would give us just a shapeless mush.
By the time of Principia Russell had been forced by the paradoxes to abandon
that conception of the variable, so that a variable now ranges only over things of
the same logical type as the constant it replaces. With that change Russell lost
his reason for holding that the place of a logical constant is not accessible to a
variable . . . . But he had not given up the idea that logic must generalize wherever
it can. So by his own conception of the subject the basic laws of Principia have
no business being in the book at all. (2000, 182–3)
A few orienting remarks are needed before discussing the substance of
Sullivan’s view. First, “generalization” in the present context is a quasi-
syntactic operation: it involves substituting the propositional constituent
expressed by the linguistic variable— “x”, “y”, etc.—for a propositional
constituent that is not expressed by any such letter (or simultaneously mak-
ing a number of such substitutions).35 Second, existential generalization is
not at issue: all replacing variables should be understood as tacitly bound by
a universal quantifier. Third, although Sullivan observes that generalizing on
everything would lead to a “shapeless mush” (i.e., to nonsense), what he really
needs to show is that generalizing on any logical constant in a proposition
of logic would lead to nonsense—only if that is so can the propositions of
logic be thought to be maximally generalized.
As Sullivan notes, owing to the type stratification of the system of Prin-
cipia, this conception of logic does not accord with Russell’s practice in that
work. The logical law: [2] “∀f ∀x (fx v not-fx ⊃ fx v not-fx),” for example,
may be generalized to yield: [3] “∀R∀f ∀x ((fx R not-fx) ⊃ (fx R not-fx)),”
where, owing to type stratification, the variable “R” ranges only over rela-
tions that can be significantly said to relate propositions. Proposition [3] is
thus both significant and true. Principia is therefore committed to logical
laws that are maximally generalized neither in Sullivan’s syntactic sense nor,
indeed, in the stricter sense of truth-preserving syntactic generalization.36
Does this fact betray a tension between Russell’s official conception of
logic and his logical practice in Principia? Or does it merely show that he
entertained no conception of logic as maximally generalized (in the senses
currently under discussion) in his major logical works? I’m inclined to favour
the latter view because the supposed official conception turns out to be in-
compatible even with Russell’s logical practice in the Principles. Consider, for
example, the second primitive proposition of logic in the Principles’ “calcu-
lus of propositions”: [4] “∀p ∀q (If q implies p, then q implies q).” (Principles
§ 18). Since the variables in [4] range over all terms without restriction, one
may substitute for “p” any name at all, including the name of any of Russell’s
logical constants. An instance of [4], therefore, is: [5] “∀q (If q implies ∈ then
q implies q).” Proposition [5] is a generalized conditional containing none
but logical constants and featuring occurrences of the same bound variable
in both antecedent and consequent. It thus has the form of “a proposition
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of pure mathematics” in Russell’s technical sense (Principles § 1). And since
Russell’s logicism commits him to the view that all propositions of pure math-
ematics are theorems of logic, he is therefore committed to regarding [5] as
a proposition of logic. But generalization on the membership relation in [5]
yields [4]. So [5], despite being a logical law, can be further generalized—
again, even in the strong sense of truth-preserving generalization.
So it seems that in neither of Russell’s major logical works does logic
comprise a body of maximally generalized truths (in the senses of “gener-
alization” currently under consideration). But if that is so, how are we to
explain those passages that seem to suggest that Russell did conceive of logic
in this way?
Let us begin by considering more closely the remark quoted by Sullivan:
“So long as any term in our proposition can be turned into a variable, our
proposition can be generalized; and so long as this is possible, it is the busi-
ness of mathematics to do it” (Principles § 8). Considered in isolation, this
remark strongly suggests Sullivan’s reading, but when the context is restored
that impression quickly evaporates. What Russell means by “generalization”
in the present context is illustrated by the transition from: [6] “∀x (x is a
Greek implies x is a man)” to: [7] “∀a, b (if a and b are classes and a is
contained in b, then x is an a implies x is a b)” (These are Russell’s own
examples from Principles § 8). In this process, Russell says: “symbols which
stood for constants become transformed into variables, and new constants are
substituted, consisting of classes to which the old constants belong” (ibid.,
emphasis added). It follows that generalization in the sense of the Principles
need not result in a decrease in the number of constants in a proposition; it is
guaranteed to result only in a decrease in the number of non-logical constants.
So, in urging that it is the business of mathematics to generalize propositions,
Russell is urging only that the propositions of pure mathematics should be
free of non-logical constants.37 But, as the example of [5] showed, that is
perfectly compatible with their being further generalizable in Sullivan’s sense.
What, then, are we to make of Russell’s characterizations, appearing from
1913 onwards, of the propositions of logic as “completely” general? In my
view, there are two ideas involved here. The first is the relatively straight-
forward idea that the propositions of logic may be viewed as the limits of a
process of generalization that involves taking a logical truth and uniformly
replacing its non-logical constants with variables. This seems to me the best
way of taking the purport of Russell’s claim in the introduction to the sec-
ond edition of the Principles that the propositions of logic must have “com-
plete generality” in the sense that they must mention “no particular thing
or quality”38 (Principles, xii). For the examples he gives of propositions that
mention no “particular things or properties” in other works are presented
as obtainable in precisely this way (see, for example, Russell 1993b, 197–
9). According to this way of thinking, then, Russell is not suggesting in
the introduction to the Principles that the logical connectives do not refer.
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Rather, when he says that the propositions of logic mention no “particu-
lar thing or quality” he just means that they—or strictly speaking the sen-
tences that express them—contain no expressions referring to non-logical
entities.
The second idea involved when Russell describes the propositions of
logic as “completely general,” is the more radical—if less confidently
propounded—idea that what is expressed by the logical connectives is just
an aspect of the proposition’s form. This idea first appears in the 1913
Theory of Knowledge manuscript where Russell says: “‘Logical constants,’
which might seem to be entities occurring in logical propositions, are really
concerned with pure form, and are not actually constituents of the proposi-
tions in the verbal expression of which their names occur” (1992b, 97–98).
The Theory of Knowledge manuscript was, of course, eventually abandoned,
so one cannot put too much weight on this remark. However, the idea is
mooted again some five years later in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.
There Russell suggests that the complete generality of logical propositions
is owed to their containing no terms referring to logical constants (in the
non-linguistic sense of “logical constant”): “[By] completely general proposi-
tions . . . I mean propositions . . . that contain only variables and nothing else
at all. This covers the whole of logic. Every logical proposition consists wholly
and solely of variables” (1988b, 237). However, although Russell was plainly
drawn to this conception, he was never fully satisfied with it. The discussion
from The Philosophy of Logical Atomism concludes on a note of indecision
and puzzlement: “So it seems as though all the propositions of logic were
entirely devoid of constituents. I do not think that can quite be true. But
then the only other thing you can seem to say is that the form is a con-
stituent, that propositions of a certain form are always true: that may be the
right analysis, though I very much doubt whether it is” (1988b, 239). The
alternative suggested in the third sentence of this quotation is more firmly
embraced the following year when in his Introduction to Mathematical Phi-
losophy Russell adopts as a “first approximation” the view that “forms are
what enter into logical propositions as their constituents” (Russell 1993b,
199).
It seems, then, that when Russell characterizes the propositions of logic
as “completely general” he either has in mind the wholly standard idea that
they contain no non-logical constants, or he means something highly non-
standard, which, however, is only tentatively floated and is anyway clearly at
odds with his conception of logic in both the Principles and in Principia. There
is no reason to think that this latter conception pre-dates 1913, and there is
no reason to think it could be a part of any allegedly shared outlook on
logic characteristic of the early logicists. Indeed, on the question of whether
the logical connectives refer to material or formal aspects of the proposition
Frege’s view would seem to be diametrically opposed to that of post-1913
Russell. In 1906 he writes:
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Logic is not . . . unrestrictedly formal . . . Just as the concept point belongs to ge-
ometry, so logic, too, has its own concepts and relations; and it is only in virtue
of this that it can have a content. Toward what is thus proper to it, its relation
is not at all formal. No science is completely formal; . . . To logic, for example,
there belong the following: negation, identity, subsumption, subordination of
concepts. (Frege 1906, 428)
For Frege, then, logic’s “own” concepts and relations are genuine concepts
and relations, not aspects of a proposition’s form, and the senses of the
logical connectives are very much constituents of the thoughts in whose verbal
expression those connectives occur.
Using Goldfarb’s remarks as a starting point, we have now examined two
ways of making sense of the idea that the propositions of logic are maximally
general truths, neither of which seems to fit with Russell’s conception of logic.
I turn now to a third.
3. Logic as “Absolutely General”
In his 1926 essay “Mathematical Logic,” F. P. Ramsey observes that: “When
Mr Russell first said that mathematics could be reduced to logic, his view of
logic was that it consisted of all true absolutely general propositions, proposi-
tions, that is, which contained no material (as opposed to logical) constants”
(Ramsey 1990, 238). In other words, when Russell first enunciates the logicist
thesis—and presumably Ramsey means in the Principles—he conceives of
logic as the totality of true propositions containing just logical constants and
(possibly) variables. Such an interpretation is defensible. It is sensitive to the
Principles’s recognition of non-general propositions as logical axioms, and it
is a close (if not exact) fit with the characterization of logic Russell offers in
§ 10 of the Principles. There Russell says: “Logic consists of the premises of
mathematics, together with all other propositions which are concerned ex-
clusively with logical constants and variables but do not fulfil the [definition
of mathematics in Principles § 1].” That definition ran: “Pure Mathematics
is the class of all propositions of the form ‘p implies q,’ where p and q are
propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two proposi-
tions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants.”
The lack of perfect fit is plausibly the result of charitable interpretation by
Ramsey. First, Russell should have stated explicitly that the propositions of
logic are truths of the form in question. Second, Russell’s use of the word
“other” is unwarranted given his inclusion of propositions not containing
variables among the “premises of mathematics.”
Ramsey’s characterization is broadly faithful to Russell intentions, but in
what way does it portray logic as maximally (or, in Ramsey’s phrase, “ab-
solutely”) general? One promising suggestion that could be made here—and
perhaps has been made39—is that logic may be thought to count as maximally
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general because it employs nothing but “topic-neutral” or “topic-universal”
vocabulary—vocabulary, that is to say, that admits of appropriate employ-
ment within any area of discourse. This would certainly bring out one sense
in which the propositions of logic could be thought of as importantly dis-
tinct from non-logical propositions, and as lying, so to speak, at one extreme
of meaningful discourse. But the challenge is to explain what counts as an
“appropriate employment.” If that question is rarely addressed, it is perhaps
because it seems obvious that each of the familiar logical constants—“and,”
“or,” “not,” “for all,” etc. —can be appropriately employed within any area
of discourse on just about any reasonable understanding of “appropriate em-
ployment.” But matters are less transparent when we turn to Russell’s works.
Are the notions of class-membership and denoting—two of Russell’s logical
constants in the Principles—really appropriately employed within any area
of discourse? Perhaps they are,40 but much more would now need to be said
about what counts as an appropriate employment. More worryingly, the sug-
gestion that the logical laws of Principia are maximally general in this sense
is plainly flawed.
The difficulty concerns the type stratification of propositions. The hierar-
chy of propositions in Principia—as described in ∗1241—begins with “elemen-
tary propositions,” which contain no “apparent variables” (i.e., no quanti-
fied variables); at the next level there are propositions containing quantifiers
over individuals (i.e., “first order propositions”), at the next, propositions
containing quantifiers over first-order quantifier-free propositional functions
(“second order propositions”), at the next, propositions containing quanti-
fiers over second-order quantifier-free propositional functions (“third order
propositions”), and so on. This hierarchy induces a parallel hierarchy in
the logical connectives. At the bottom there is the kind of disjunction that
can meaningfully disjoin only elementary propositions; at the next level, the
kind that can meaningfully disjoin only first order propositions, and so on
(cf. Principia, 127). It follows that the connective used to disjoin elementary
propositions, in spite of being intuitively a logical constant, cannot be em-
ployed as a propositional connective in discourse involving quantification.
In fact, the problem is quite general: on the conception of Principia, for
any logical constant there will be areas of discourse within which it cannot
be meaningfully employed—and thus cannot be legitimately employed, ac-
cording to the standards of legitimacy embodied in ramified type–theory. It
seems, then, that to the extent that the conception of logic Ramsey attributes
to Russell warrants the description “maximally general” it is a conception
that applies at best only to the Principles.
Having offered his characterization of the Principles’s conception of logic
Ramsey goes on to point out that Russell later abandoned it. However, he
avoids venturing any opinion about when that change occurred. Ramsey’s
reticence on this point is understandable for the textual record here is murky.
On the one hand, traces of the Principles’s conception of logic do seem to
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be present in the first edition of Principia. Consider, for example the au-
thors’ explanation: “When we say that a proposition “belongs to logic” we
mean that it can be expressed in terms of the primitive ideas of logic . . . ”
(Principia, 93, footnote). Russell and Whitehead neglect to mention that a
proposition that “belongs to logic” must be true, but the examples in the
body of the text strongly suggest that the requirement of truth is being taken
for granted.42 A similar characterization occurs in “The Philosophical Im-
portance of Mathematical Logic” (hereafter “PIML”), an essay that Russell
presented in Paris on the 22nd of March 1911 to the French Mathematical
Society: “[By a process of generalization beginning with a valid deduction]
we finally reach a proposition of pure logic, that is to say, a proposition that
does not contain any other constants than logical constants” (1992a, 35, em-
phasis added). Again, there is no mention of truth, but Russell’s subsequent
uses of the phrase “proposition of pure logic” strongly suggest that he meant
to reserve the term for true logical propositions.43
Going by these remarks alone, it would be reasonable to suppose that
the Principles’s conception of logic survives into Principia and beyond. But
matters are complicated by Russell’s decision not to treat the so-called “axiom
of infinity,” which he formulates in purely logical terms, as a genuine axiom
in Principia. (Instead, he adds it as an antecedent to the theorems to be
proved “whenever it is relevant.” See Principia vol. 2, 183.) If such a decision
were attributable merely to uncertainty on Russell’s part about the axiom’s
truth, one would still be able to interpret him as subscribing in Principia to the
Principles’s conception of logic. For one could consistently take Russell’s view
to have been that, while he could not be certain of the axiom’s truth, he was
certain that if it were true, it would be a proposition of logic. However, one
cannot rule out that his decision turned, instead, on uncertainty about the
axiom’s status as a proposition of logic. After all, from 1907 on Russell was
happy to treat another proposition he recognized as lacking self-evidence—
viz., the axiom of reducibility—as a genuine axiom of his logical system.44
Moreover, the idea that the Principles’s conception survives into PIML is
thrown into doubt by Russell’s acknowledgment in his 1911 article, “On
the Axioms of the Infinite and the Transfinite” (hereafter “AIT”), which he
presented to another Paris audience on the same day he presented PIML, that
the axiom of infinity, although it “may be formulated in logical terms, cannot
be proved using the principles of logic” and is therefore “purely empirical”
(1992a, 52).45 That acknowledgment suggests that, in spite of his remarks
in PIML, Russell had recognized by 1911 that being true and containing
no constants but logical constants is not sufficient to constitute something a
proposition of logic.
The authors of Principia say too little to permit the drawing of firm con-
clusions about whether any of its volumes retains a commitment to the Prin-
ciples’s conception of logic, though it is clear that the problems with that con-
ception had dawned on Russell by 1911. It is clear, however, that Ramsey’s
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remark does at least (more or less) correctly characterize Russell’s conception
of logic in the Principles, and, as we have seen, there is arguably (pending fur-
ther explanation of the concept of “appropriate employment”) one sense in
which that conception portrays the logic of that work as maximally general.
4. Russell’s Attempt to Characterize the Logical Constants
If the Principles’s conception of logic did survive into Principia, Russell might
have been expected to reconsider the problem of how to characterize the
logical constants—a problem that he had viewed as insoluble in the Principles
(§ 10). And interestingly, in PIML, immediately after giving the gloss on “a
proposition of pure logic” that suggests the Principles’s conception of logic,
he does precisely that:
The definition of the logical constants is not easy, but this much may be said: A
constant is logical if the propositions in which it is found still contain it when
we try to replace it by a variable. More exactly, we may perhaps characterize the
logical constants in the following manner: If we take any deduction and replace
its terms by variables, it will happen, after a certain number of stages, that the
constants which still remain in the deduction belong to a certain group, and,
if we try to push generalization still farther, there will always remain constants
which belong to this same group. This group is the group of logical constants.
(1992a, 35–6)
Russell’s idea is hardly transparent, but it would seem to involve defin-
ing the notion of a logical constant in terms of the notions of an intuitively
valid argument and the notion of “truth-preserving generalization” discussed
earlier. To understand Russell’s idea we shall need to explain this kind of gen-
eralization in more detail. Let us call the operation of replacing one or more
occurrences of a constant with a variable and prefacing the result with a uni-
versal quantifier binding that variable “syntactic generalization.” Then by an
instance of “truth-preserving generalization” (hereafter “t-generalization”)
we shall mean an instance of syntactic generalization that preserves truth.
So, for instance, [8] “Socrates is wise ⊃ Socrates is wise” t-generalizes to
[9] “∀x (x is wise ⊃ x is wise),” which t-generalizes further to [10] “∀f ∀x
(fx ⊃ fx).” A “maximally t-generalized” proposition is one that admits of
no further t-generalization. The proposition [10], for example, is maximally
t-generalized because the replacement of any of its logical constants—“⊃,”
“∀x,” and “∀f ”—results in a falsehood. The result of replacing the relation
of material implication by a bound variable ranging over relations, viz., [11]
“∀ϕ∀f ∀x (fx ϕ fx),” is false because “ϕ” includes within its range of signif-
icance a relation that holds between two propositions just in case they have
different truth-values. Likewise, the result of replacing the first–order uni-
versal quantifier in [10] with a variable, ‘Q,’ ranging over all propositional
functions of the same type as this quantifier—viz. [12] “∀Q ∀fQ (fx⊃fx)”—is
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false because it has among its instances the false proposition: [13] “∀f ∃3x
(fx⊃fx),” where “∃3x x” is the numerically definite quantifier: “there are
exactly three xs such that x.” While, finally, the result of replacing the quan-
tifier over first-order propositional functions, “∀f , ” with a variable ranging
over all propositional functions of the same type as this quantifier is false
because it has among its instances the falsehood: [14] “∃3f ∀x (fx⊃fx).”
Russell was never careful to distinguish between an argument (or “de-
duction”) and the corresponding logically true conditional;46 so we might
charitably reconstruct his proposal as follows: The logical constants are just
those constants that remain at the limit of iterated t-generalization upon log-
ical truths. More precisely, something is a logical constant just in case it is
a constant and occurs in some proposition obtained from a logical truth by
iterated t-generalization. And by a “logical truth” I mean what we usually
think of as an instance of a logical law. Thus “⊃,” “∀x,” and “∀f ” all count
as logical constants because each of them occurs in [10], which is obtained
as the limit of iterated t-generalization on the logical truth [8].
Unfortunately, however, the definition has a fatal flaw: even if it were
correct, it would be powerless to convey an understanding of the notion of
a logical constant to someone who lacked it. For the ability to recognize a
proposition as a logical truth rests on the ability to recognize it as true in
virtue of the meanings of its logical constants. If, for example, one were in
doubt about whether to count the relation of identity as a logical constant,
one could be no more certain whether the proposition: “if Twain=Clemens
and Clemens=Smith then Twain=Smith” was a logical truth. Since what is
wanted from a definition of the notion of a logical constant is something
that could impart an understanding of this notion, the present definition will
have to be rejected.
5. Logic as a Universal Language
One final suggestion that deserves careful consideration is that Russell’s con-
ception of logic counts as “universalist” because he conceives of his logical
system as a “universal language” or “universal framework for rational dis-
course.” This idea is often presented as a premise in an argument that Russell
rejected metalogical inquiry.47 According to the “no-metalogic” interpreta-
tion, it is not just that Russell happens not to engage in metalogical investi-
gations, but rather that his universalism somehow commits him to regarding
such questions as unintelligible. This claim was famously advanced by Dreben
and van Heijenoort in their introductory note to Gödel’s completeness proof:
For Frege, and then for Russell and Whitehead, logic was universal: within each
explicit formulation of logic all deductive reasoning, including all of classical
analysis and much of Cantorian set theory, was to be formalized. Hence not
only was pure quantification theory never at the centre of their attention, but
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metasystematic questions as such, for example the question of completeness,
could not be meaningfully raised. We can give different formulations of logic,
formulations that differ with respect to what logical constants are taken as prim-
itive or what formulas are taken as formal axioms, but we have no vantage point
from which we can survey a given formalism as a whole, let alone look at logic
whole. . . . We are within logic and cannot look at it from outside. We are subject
to what Sheffer called “the logocentric predicament.” (1986, 44).
Dreben and van Heijenoort never spelled out the argument behind the
“hence” that begins their second sentence, but the general idea, judging by
the elaborations of those who have subsequently endorsed their conclusion,48
would seem to be as follows: According to Russell’s universalist conception
of logic, “the logical system provides a universal language; it is the universal
framework inside of which all rational discourse proceeds” (Goldfarb 1989,
27). That being so, no rational argument can be conducted outside of the
system, and so none can be conducted about the system.49
Recently, Jason Stanley and Jamie Tappenden have each questioned this
last “and so” on the grounds that it trades on an anachronistic view of the
possibilities. They point out that although in the light of the Gödel−Tarski
limitative results, we now have grounds to doubt that a sufficiently rich sys-
tem’s semantics and metatheory can be developed within that very system
itself, nonetheless at the time Russell was writing these grounds had yet to be
discovered. Since that is so, and since before Gödel the default assumption
would have been that it was possible to do metatheory in the very language
or system about which the metatheoretical results speak, there would have
been no reason for Russell to infer from the status of his system of logic as
a “universal language” that metalogical inquiry was therefore precluded.50
I find this objection compelling. If we maintain a clear distinction between,
on the one hand, having a metaperspective on a language (that is, being able
to speak and reason about it), and, on the other, having a perspective external
to a language (that is, being able to discuss the language of the system in some
other language) then we should have no inclination to infer from Russell’s
alleged repudiation of the latter that he also repudiated the former.
The assumption that Russell regarded his system as a “universal language”
is itself questionable. Russell never makes such a claim, and he was well aware
of the possibility of alternative systematizations of logic (Principles § 31). It
cannot be ruled out that he would have viewed these as alternative frameworks
for rational inquiry. So it is far from clear that he would have regarded his
own somewhat arbitrarily chosen system to be a universal language in the
present sense. It bears mentioning that commentators who attribute to Russell
a universalist conception of logic sometimes seem to attribute along with it
a general blindness on Russell’s part to the distinction between logic itself
and one of the logical systems designed to capture it.51 If we suppose that
Russell failed to draw that distinction, then, because—as all sides agree—“one
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cannot get outside of logic,” it might seem as though Russell could not have
made sense of the idea of an external perspective on his logical system. But
Russell’s awareness of the possibility of alternate systematizations shows that
he did draw the distinction.52
Finally, there is the rather straightforward textual point that, far from re-
jecting metalogical claims as meaningless, Russell is prepared on occasion to
make them. Moreover, when he does so, he is perfectly aware of the meta-
systematic purport of his claims. Thus, in his 1907 article “The Regressive
Method of Discovering the Premises of Mathematics,” having conceded the
apparent absurdity of proving obvious truths such as “2 + 2 = 4” from less
obvious truths such as the axiom of reducibility, Russell goes on to say: “But
of course what we are really proving is not the truth of 2 + 2 = 4, but the
fact that from our premises this truth can be deduced” (Lackey 1973, 272).
Part of the value of logicism, he implies, is that it furnishes such metalogical
dependence results. But, obviously, if what we are really doing when we de-
rive “2 + 2 = 4” is proving that this proposition is provable in the system,
then the possibility of making truth-evaluable claims about the system fol-
lows immediately. A second metalogical claim occurs in Russell’s 1911 article
“On the Axioms of the Infinite and Transfinite.” Speaking of his so-called
“multiplicative axiom,” a version of the axiom of choice, Russell says that
this axiom is true “despite the fact that it does not follow from the other
axioms” (1992a, 51; emphasis added). The context makes clear that what
Russell refers to here as “the other axioms” are the other axioms of pure
mathematics, hence logical axioms in Russell’s broad sense of “logic,” which
includes the ramified theory of types. Intriguingly, Russell even goes so far as
to claim that Peano “proved the independence of the [multiplicative] axiom”
(ibid)—although by what means, unfortunately, he does not say.53 At any
rate, it is clear that Russell takes the multiplicative axiom to be independent
of his other axioms. And since he takes this axiom to be logically true, if true
at all (Russell 1992a, 52), it is clear that he finds the idea that a proposition
of logic should admit of an independence proof at least intelligible.54
Another metalogical question that Russell would surely have found intel-
ligible is that of completeness. Given that Russell (at one stage) conceived
the truths of logic as precisely those expressible in purely logical vocabulary
he would have been able to ask whether all such truths were provable within
his logical system. Since this question makes use of a faulty conception of
logic it isn’t the question of completeness, but it is hard to see why Russell
wouldn’t have regarded it as an intelligible metalogical question.55
But even if Dreben and van Heijenoort are wrong about their unintel-
ligibility claim, might not a weaker claim in the same spirit be defended?
Could it be that Russell’s conception of logic involves commitments that
preclude him from giving demonstrative metalogical proofs, even if he does
regard the questions that these proofs aim to settle as intelligible? This is a
broad question, which has been explored to some extent by other writers,56
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so—to continue the present theme—I will confine myself to asking whether
Russell’s conception of logic precludes demonstrative independence proofs.
Again, the answer would seem to be: no. It is plausible that Russell’s concep-
tion of logic rules out one method of giving such proofs, namely, that which
involves reinterpreting the logical connectives.57 For proofs of this kind are
aimed at showing one sentence to be logically independent of a set of others,
while Russell would in all likelihood have conceived of an independence proof
as a proof concerning non-linguistic propositions. However, this is not the
only method by which demonstrative independence proofs might be given. As
Tappenden has observed, in 1906 Frege sketches a quite different technique
for demonstrating independence that involves proving that one thought can-
not be proved from a group of others.58 Of course, Russell had not developed
any such technique, but there would seem to be nothing in his conception of
logic that would have prevented him from doing so.
What, then, leads commentators to attribute to Russell a commitment
to the unintelligibility—or at least, unfeasibility—of independence proofs?
The text most often cited in support of these attributions is a passage from
the Principles in which Russell denies the feasibility of giving independence
arguments for the logical axioms of his “calculus of propositions.”59 Russell
says:
Some indemonstrables there must be; and some propositions, such as the syllo-
gism, must be of the number, since no demonstration is possible without them.
But concerning others, it may be doubted whether they are indemonstrable or
merely undemonstrated; and it should be observed that the method of suppos-
ing an axiom false, and deducing the consequences of this assumption, which
has been found admirable in such cases as the axiom of parallels, is here not
universally available. For all our axioms are principles of deduction; and if they
are true, the consequences which appear to follow from the employment of an
opposite principle will not really follow, so that arguments from the supposition
of the falsity of an axiom are here subject to special fallacies. (Principles § 17)60
This remark has been read as showing that Russell has some kind of objection
of principle to the very idea of giving demonstrative independence proofs for
logical axioms. But a closer examination of this passage (which I will call
“the key passage”) fails to bear this out.
The first question that needs to be addressed is why the method of “sup-
posing an axiom false, etc.” should, in Russell’s opinion, have proved itself
“admirable” in the case of the axiom of parallels. The answer is to be found
in a passage from Russell’s 1902 Encyclopaedia Britannica article on non-
Euclidean geometry. Having briefly discussed the attempts of Clavius, and
later Wallis, to deduce the parallels postulate directly from equivalent axioms,
Russell remarks:
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A new method, which, though it failed to lead to the desired goal, proved in
the end immensely fruitful, was invented by Saccheri, in a work entitled Eu-
clides ab omni naevo vindicatus (Milan, 1733). If the postulate of parallels is
involved in Euclid’s other assumptions, contradictions must emerge when it is
denied while the others are maintained. This led Saccheri to attempt a reductio
ad absurdum, in which he mistakenly believed himself to have succeeded. What
is interesting, however, is not his fallacious conclusion, but the non-Euclidean
results which he obtains in the process . . . . Many of the results afterwards ob-
tained by Lobatchewsky and Bolyai are here developed. Saccheri fails to be
the founder of non-Euclidean Geometry only because he does not perceive the
possible truth of his non-Euclidean hypotheses. (1993c, 474–5)
The “new method” of attempting to prove the parallels postulate was proof by
reductio ad absurdum.61 Although this method did not lead to the desired goal,
it proved “immensely fruitful” because it suggested the existence of interesting
systems of non-Euclidean geometry that turned out, on subsequent inquiry,
to be consistent relative to Euclidean geometry.62 Notice that one would be
led to investigate these systems in their own right, and to try to find relative
consistency proofs for them, only if one took seriously the possibility that
the parallels postulate might be incapable of being derived from the other
axioms. So we might say that what in the first instance made Saccheri’s method
fruitful was the fact that its employment yielded defeasible, non-demonstrative
evidence of the indemonstrability of the parallels postulate from the other
Euclidean axioms. Such evidence consisted in the numerous failed attempts
to prove a contradiction from the denial of the parallels postulate in the
context of the other axioms.
It is worth mentioning that the general idea that the failure of repeated
attempts to prove something can amount to evidence that it cannot be proved
is one that Russell takes seriously. In AIT he remarks that: “It is hardly
believable that every class can be well-ordered. Many clever mathematicians
have tried to find a well-ordered sequence of real numbers, but no one has
succeeded in finding such a sequence. Such arguments do not have much
weight, but they must be given a certain value.”63 In the Principles Russell
makes a similar appeal to a plausibility argument when he comments that:
“As soon as it was found that the similarity of whole and part could be proved
to be impossible for every finite whole, it became not implausible to suppose
that for infinite wholes, where the impossibility could not be proved, there was
in fact no such impossibility” (Principles, § 341). Russell’s point is that once
techniques for proving a lack of “similarity”64 of classes had been developed,
the fact that a proof of the lack of similarity of an infinite class and its proper
subclass was not forthcoming provided defeasible evidence that such a result
could not be proved. The principle on which Russell is relying in each of
these passages—for better or worse—is that: “If many clever mathematicians
have tried for some time to prove that p, without success (when techniques
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for giving similar proofs are available), then there is some (non-conclusive)
reason to believe that p is false.” Of course, this is a stronger conclusion
than Russell is entitled to. At most, the fact clever mathematicians have
tried for some time to prove something without success provides defeasible
evidence that it is unprovable in the system (or systems) in question, not that
it is false. But what matters for our purposes is that Russell is committed
also to the weaker (and more tenable) claim about defeasible evidence for
unprovability.
Apart from his tendency to slide from considerations of provability to
considerations of truth, Russell is not idiosyncratic in holding such views.
The assumption that a repeated failure to prove a result can, in certain cases,
constitute a plausibility argument for its unprovability seems to have been
common coin among Russell’s contemporaries. Frege, for example, in his
1914 lecture notes “Logic in Mathematics” says: “If . . . we went on drawing
inference after inference [from a conditional whose antecedent contradicted
the axiom of parallels] and still did not come up against a contradiction
anywhere, we should certainly become more and more inclined to regard the
axiom as incapable of proof. Nevertheless, we should still, strictly speaking,
not have proved this to be so.”65 And Roberto Bonola, in his 1906 survey of
non-Euclidean geometry, says: “The very fact that the innumerable attempts
made to obtain a proof did not lead to the wished-for result, would suggest
the thought that its demonstration is impossible . . . But such considerations
cannot be held to afford a proof of the impossibility in question.”66 Unless
these remarks relate merely to human psychological tendencies, they sug-
gest that failure to prove a proposition might constitute non-demonstrative
grounds for its indemonstrability.
We can understand why Russell sees the method of reductio as having
proved “immensely fruitful”: if one succeeds in deriving a contradiction, one
will have proved a dependence result, but repeated failures will constitute
mounting non-demonstrative evidence of independence. It follows that the
possibility of demonstrative independence results, far from being ruled out in
the key passage, is not even in question.
Nor does the argument of the key passage rule out non-demonstrative
independence arguments tout court. For Russell is not speaking of logical
axioms in general, but only of the axioms of the Principles’s “calculus of
propositions.” So when he says “all our axioms are principles of deduction”
he means that all the axioms of the Principles’s calculus of propositions are
principles of deduction, not that all the axioms of logic are. Indeed, he is
explicit that not all of the axioms of his various logical calculi count as
principles of deduction.67 Accordingly, Russell’s explanation of why non-
demonstrative independence proofs cannot be given for the axioms of the
calculus of propositions is specific to that system: such proofs are unavailable
because those axioms all happen to be “principles of deduction.” This means
that they play a double role in proofs, functioning both as axioms and as
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inference rules.68 But there is no hint that all logical axioms have this double-
aspect. Nor does Russell claim that non-demonstrative independence proofs
are impossible for logical axioms in general. Instead, he makes the much
weaker claim that the method in question is “here [i.e., in the case of logic,
as opposed to non-Euclidean geometry] not universally available.” Such a
claim leaves open, and, arguably, implicates, that, in the case of logic, the
method is sometimes available—presumably when the axioms in question are
not “principles of deduction.”
Exactly why the usual method is not applicable to “principles of deduc-
tion” is not entirely clear,69 but for our purposes what matters is just that
the barrier to non-demonstrative independence arguments is supposed to be
peculiar to principles of deduction (i.e., to logical axioms that double as infer-
ence rules). That being so, the possibility remains of giving non-demonstrative
independence arguments for axioms that do not have this feature, for example,
the multiplicative axiom, which, indeed, Russell claims to be independent of
the other axioms. Moreover, the whole discussion leaves it open that Russell
might have allowed demonstrative independence proofs to be given, had he
thought of a way of giving them. Of course, none of this is to deny that
Russell shows little interest in developing metalogic as a science in its own
right, but that is plausibly because his interests lie elsewhere. His aim is to
show that mathematics is a branch of logic, not to investigate the logical
system in which that reduction is to be carried out. But, the fact that Rus-
sell does not take up these questions is not, by itself, any reason to think
that he found them unintelligible or in principle resistant to mathematical
treatment.
Conclusion
In closing, it would be worth summarizing the respects in which there is
something right about the thought that Russell has (at some stage in his
career) a “universalist conception of logic.” First, it is true that in the years
(late) 1905 to 1907 Russell treats the variable as universal in the sense of
ranging without restriction over everything in his ontology. Insofar as the
laws of logic are formulated using such variables they are therefore universal.
Second, from 1913 to 1918 Russell toys with the idiosyncratic idea that the
propositions of logic are “completely general” in the sense of containing
no constants at all, not even logical constants. But he seems never to have
been fully satisfied with this conception. Third, from the Principles onward,
Russell rejects (what he takes to be) Kant’s view that there are mathematically
valid, but logically invalid modes of reasoning; so it is true to say that he takes
logic to be universal in the weak sense that once all non-logical principles have
been recorded as premises, all reasoning from this basis can be represented as
logically valid reasoning. But this conception is hardly unique to Russell, or
even to the early logicists. Fourth, in the Principles Russell does arguably (and
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subject to further clarification of the notion of “appropriate employment”)
present a conception of logic that qualifies as “maximally general,” insofar
as he presents logic as a body of truths formulable using only vocabulary
that could be appropriately applied within any area of discourse. He does
not, however, emphasize this feature of his conception himself, and it cannot
be said to apply to Principia.
These results are, I submit, rather too meagre to justify the emphasis that
has been placed in the secondary literature on Russell’s supposed universal-
ism. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that “universalist” label, insofar as it
reflects the attempt to capture some deep way of looking at logic shared by
and unique to the progenitors of the modern subject is, on balance, an un-
helpful one—though I hope that seeing why it is unhelpful might nonetheless
have some value.70
Notes
1 See, for example: van Heijenoort 1967, 326; Hylton 1980, 2–3, and 1990, 200; Dreben and
van Heijenoort 1986, 44; Hintikka 1988, 1–2; Urquhart 1988, 83; Goldfarb 2001, 28.
2 A sign of the lack of clarity about the content of universalism is disagreement among
commentators about who the other universalists are. Thus Jaakko Hintikka locates Wittgenstein
within what he calls “the universalist tradition” (1988, 1–2), while Thomas Ricketts (1996, 59)
and Warren Goldfarb (2001, 29) take him to have repudiated it. No doubt the difference of
opinion reflects differing emphases on the various strands in the universalist idea, but it does
bring out—in a dramatic fashion—the need for clarification.
3 Urquhart 1988, 83.
4 Hylton 1990, 200.
5 Ricketts 1996, 59.
6 Goldfarb 1989, 27.
7 Goldfarb 1979, 353, Hylton 1980, 2–3, Dreben and van Heijenoort 1986, 44–5.
8 I will not consider every sense in which logic might be said to be “universal” or “maximally
general,” but only those that have a prima facie claim to characterize Russell’s logic. In particular,
I shall not discuss Frege’s idea that logical laws count as “the most general laws” because they
“prescribe universally the way in which one ought to think if one is to think at all” (Frege
1893, xv). John MacFarlane has made a convincing case that Frege regards logic as distinctively
general in this sense (2002, 35–37). There is, however, no hint of such a view in Russell.
9 Composed in January 1901, and published in July 1901.
10 Russell’s distinctive notion of a proposition—as a non-linguistic complex of terms—is
explained later in this section.
11 That is, roughly, universally quantified bound variables. Russell does not use any sign
except the variable to indicate universal generality in the Principles. In what follows, however, I
will when appropriate cater to modern sensibilities by supplying initial universal quantifiers.
12 I use parentheses for grouping where Russell uses single quotation marks (cf. Principles
§ 19). Here I ignore the fact that conjunction is strictly speaking a defined term in the system
of the Principles, and I follow Russell in using “if . . . then” instead of “implies” when doing so
enhances readability.
13 James Levine (2001a) has argued persuasively that in 1901 Russell held the variables
occurring in non-logical generalizations to be restricted. Such a view would have made sense of
his attempt at that time to characterize the propositions of logic as precisely those containing
unrestricted variables. The disappearance of this characterization from the published version of
26 NOÛS
the Principles can be explained by Russell’s adoption there of a variable ranging over all terms
in all laws, whether logical or no, in response to his desire to give treat “x is an a implies x is a
b” as intelligible when a is an empty class. (See Levine 2001a, 220–2.)
14 Russell makes use of another non-general primitive proposition of logic in his 1901
article “The Logic of Relations” (1988a). In proving that the relation of cardinal equivalence—
“sim”—is equivalent to the relative product of some many-one relation with its converse, Russell
instantiates with the relation “sim” a general principle saying that any relation that is transitive,
symmetrical and non-empty has this property. Once this step has been taken, it remains to prove
that the relation “sim” is transitive, symmetric, non-empty and to assume that it is a relation.
This assumption is enshrined as primitive proposition number 1.11 of the system presented in
“The Logic of Relations.”
15 Peter Hylton has suggested that for Russell the propositions of logic are “wholly general”
in just this sense (1990, 201).
16 My thanks to James Levine for discussion of this point.
17 For the reasons just explained, these claims anyway have to be treated as extremely rough:
Russell is speaking only about those of his variables he regards as unrestricted.
18 As we shall see, Russell insists that every propositional constituent is an entity/term.
19 In the sentence “All men are mortal,” the words “all” and “men” do not have meaning in
isolation (cf. Principles § 72); instead, only the whole phrase “All men” expresses a propositional
constituent.
20 The problems with making good on the idea that such terms really do refer to denoting
concepts lie at the heart of Russell’s notorious “Gray’s Elegy” objection to the theory of denoting
concepts in “On Denoting.”
21 Oddly, Russell also recognizes a singleton class as many, which he identifies with its only
member, but because for present purposes nothing hangs on this complication, we shall ignore
it.
22 More often Russell allows himself to speak of the variable as occurring in the proposition
(see, e.g., Principles § 1), but he does not speak this way when the standards of precision are
raised, as, for example, when he scrutinizes the nature of the variable.
23 This entails that the variable itself does not occur in the proposition, for it cannot be
“counted as one.” Instead what occurs is a denoting concept expressed by the letter “x,” which
denoting concept denotes the variable.
24 Russell argues that because on the Principles’s theory of denoting the sentence “The King
of France is bald” fails to be about anything it ought, by the lights of that theory, to be nonsense.
But intuitively—he supposes—it is not nonsense but false. See “On Denoting” (Marsh 1988,
46).
25 This may well be one of the “grave logical problems” to which Russell eludes in the
footnote to Principles § 58.
26 Russell abandons classes as many in favour of classes as one after reading Frege in the
summer of 1902 (see Levine 2001a, 227 for details). Precisely when he abandoned indefinite
objects is less clear.
27 The view that Russell had a restricted variable in Principia is accepted by all the authors I
discuss who attribute to Russell a “universalist” conception of logic. However, it should be noted
that Gregory Landini (1998, ch. 10) has recently defended a novel interpretation according to
which Russell has an unrestricted variable even in Principia. I don’t have the space to address
Landini’s interpretation here, but I would hesitate to accept it chiefly for the reason mentioned in
Levine 2001b. The problem lies in the difficulty of reconciling Russell and Whitehead’s statement
in the second volume of Principia (1912, vii) that there are more propositional functions than
individuals with Landini’s suggestion that propositional functions should be viewed as open
sentences, of which there are only countably many.
28 In Potter forthcoming. I am indebted to this work for the quotations from Whitehead’s
correspondence with Russell.
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29 Goldfarb emphasizes the non-metalinguistic aspect of universalism in connection with
his discussion of Frege’s universalism in his (2001), 28–29. See also Hylton 1990, 202.
30 Russell never, to my knowledge, speaks of the “logical furniture of the universe.” He
does speak in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy of “the ultimate furniture of the world”
(Russell 1993b, 182), and by this he means those things that would be the referents of the
undefined symbols in a “complete symbolic language.” So at this stage he would take the ultimate
furniture of the world to include, for example, individuals but not classes. So if Goldfarb’s idea
is that the laws of logic are for Russell the most general laws there are about the ultimate furniture
of the world then the tag is redundant: to say that the laws of logic are the most general laws
about the ultimate furniture of the world is just to say they are the most general laws there
are.
31 Whether this is in fact Kant’s view remains controversial to this day.
32 For a helpful discussion of this example see Friedman 1992, ch. 1.
33 See Russell 1992a, 36; and 1993c, 377; cf. Principles § 434.
34 Goldfarb is not alone in attributing this view to Russell. See also Ricketts 1996, 59–60,
and (in connection with one part of Russell’s career) Sullivan 2000.
35 We saw in section 1 that Russell does not see this propositional constituent as a variable,
but only as a denoting concept that denotes the variable, but in the present context this detail
will be suppressed.
36 This notion of truth–preserving generalization is discussed in more detail in sections 3
and 4 below.
37 Cf. Russell 1992a, 35. The idea of demarcating the propositions of logic as those propo-
sitions that contain none but logical constants is discussed in the following section.
38 This is shorthand for “thing, quality or relation.”
39 Goldfarb may be making a similar claim when he says, in connection with Frege’s uni-
versalism: “For Frege, the laws of logic are general, not in being about nothing in particular
(about forms), but in using topic-universal vocabulary to state truths about everything” (Gold-
farb 2001, 28). This seems to suggest that part of the generality of the laws of logic is supposed
to be owed to their (exclusive?) use of topic-universal vocabulary, though Goldfarb does not go
so far as to say that this feature renders these laws maximally general.
40 I take it Russell means that denoting concepts, such as any F and the F are so applicable,
not that the relation of denoting is (See Principles, §§ 93 & 106).
41 As Michael Potter has made clear, the hierarchy in ∗12 differs in significant ways from
the hierarchy described in the introduction. (For details see Potter (2000), 139–144). These
differences, however, do not affect the present point.
42 Russell neglects the same detail in the Principles when the conception identified by
Ramsey is plausibly present.
43 For example, when Russell describes the propositions of pure logic as “self–evident general
propositions” in Our Knowledge of the External World the context makes clear that he thinks of
them as self–evidently true (Russell 1993a, 66—see also, Marsh 1988, 238–9, and Russell 1992a,
35). A similar point holds of Russell’s use of the phrase “pure logical proposition” (cf. 1992b,
98).
44 See Lackey, 281. A detailed discussion of Russell’s notion of self-evidence is contained
in Proops 2006, § 7.
45 The axiom is informally stated as the claim that “there are infinitely many individuals,”
but in Principia it is formulated as the equivalent claim that every inductive cardinal is non-
empty: in symbols: ∀n (n∈NC induct. ⊃ ∃!n) (cf. Principia vol. 2, ∗120.3).
46 See, for example, Russell 1993a, 53–4, for another instance of Russell’s casualness in this
matter.
47 For this suggestion see: Goldfarb 1979, 353; Hylton 1980, 2–3; Dreben and van Heijenoort
1986, 44–5.
48 Notably Goldfarb 1979, 353, but compare Hylton 1990, 203.
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49 This kind of argument is suggested by several remarks of Goldfarb. After citing a passage
from Principles § 17 (discussed in detail below), which he claims illustrates that “Russell often
seemed not to see the intelligibility of stepping outside the system to use an intuitive logic
in systematic arguments,” Goldfarb continues: “This lack of intelligibility may be intrinsic to
the logicist program. If the system constitutes the universal logical language, then there can
be no external standpoint from which one may view and discuss the system. Metasystematic
considerations are illegitimate rather than simply undesirable” (Goldfarb 1979, 353). In his
(1982, 693–4) Goldfarb says “Frege’s and Russell’s systems are meant to provide a universal
language: a framework inside of which all rational discourse proceeds. Thus there can be no
position outside the system from which to assess it.” And again in his (1988, 69) he says: “The
logical system Frege or Russell presupposes is meant to be the universal language, inside of
which all reasoning takes place. There is no metatheoretical stance either available or needed.”
50 Stanley and Tappenden make this point in connection with Frege, but it is equally valid
in connection with Russell. I have provided only the barest sketch of the objection. For full
details see Stanley 1996, 59, fn. 30, and Tappenden 1997, especially 222.
51 This criticism has been made in connection with writings on Frege by Peter Sullivan
(2004, 717–20).
52 The point that Russell drew such a distinction is made to good effect by Gregory Landini
(1996, 556).
53 Russell cites pages 145–8 of Peano 1906. Peano, however, offers nothing that might be
taken as a proof of the independence of the axiom of choice from some group of axioms. He
merely quotes Zermelo’s claim that the axiom of choice cannot be derived from another, simpler
logical principle.
54 Saul Kripke has recently drawn attention to a further example of a metatheoretical claim
that Russell plainly regarded as intelligible. This claim concerns what is provable in the system
of Principia and occurs in that work itself. See Kripke 2005, 1013–1014, especially footnote 20.
55 I am indebted to James Levine for this point.
56 See, e.g., Landini chs. 1 & 10.
57 For details see Hunter 1971, 122–24.
58 For details see Tappenden 1997.
59 This passage is appealed to in this way in Goldfarb 1979, 353; and Hylton 1980, 2–3.
60 Russell makes the same point in his 1903 article “Recent Work on the Philosophy of
Leibniz”:
The only ground in Symbolic Logic, for regarding an axiom as indemonstrable is,
in general, that it is undemonstrated; hence there is always hope of reducing the
number. We cannot apply the method by which, for example, the axiom of parallels
has been shown to be indemonstrable, of supposing our axiom false; for all our
axioms are concerned with principles of deduction, so that, if any one of them be
true, the consequences which might seem to follow from denying it do not follow as
a matter of fact. Thus from the hypothesis that a true principle of deduction is false,
valid inference is impossible. (1994, 547, fn. 8)
61 Throughout this discussion I am bracketing (as irrelevant) the question of the historical
accuracy of Russell’s account of Saccheri. Details of what Saccheri actually did can be found in
Webb 1995. (I am grateful to Jamie Tappenden for drawing Webb’s essay to my attention.)
62 Judson Webb (1995) has suggested that it was Russell himself who first conceived of the
work of Beltrami and Klein as showing the consistency of non-Euclidean geometries relative to
Euclid’s system.
63 Russell 1992a, 51.
64 Two sets are “similar” for Russell just in case their members can be put in one-to-one
correspondence.
65 Frege 1983, 267 [1979, 247].
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66 See Bonola, 1955, 177. I am grateful to Jamie Tappenden for drawing my attention to
these passages.
67 Russell clearly implies that only ten of his twenty logical axioms in the Principles count
as principles of deduction when he says: “By the help of ten principles of deduction and ten
other premises of a general logical nature (e.g.,“implication is a relation”), all mathematics can
be strictly and formally deduced” (Principles § 4). The ten principles of deduction are the ten
axioms of the propositional calculus. (See Principles § 17).
68 This understanding of what it means to call an axiom a “principle of deduction” receives
support from a later remark, which also throws much light on the key passage (Here Russell
speaks of “rules” rather than “principles” of deduction, but it seems overwhelmingly plausible
that the variation in terminology marks no logical distinction.):
[The] proposition [“If from p we deduce q and from q we deduce r, then from p we
deduce r”] is a rule of deduction, and the rules of deduction have a twofold use in
mathematics: both as premises and as a method of obtaining consequences of the
premises. Now, if the rules of deduction were not true, the consequences that would
be obtained by using them would not truly be consequences, so that we should not
have even a correct deduction setting out from a false premise. It is this twofold use
of the rules of deduction which differentiates the foundations of mathematics from
the later parts. In the later parts, we use the same rules of deduction to deduce, but
we no longer use them immediately as premises. Consequently, in the later parts, the
immediate premises may be false without the deductions being logically incorrect,
but, in the foundations, the deductions will be incorrect if the premises are not true.
(Russell 1992a, 37–8)
69 One way to reconstruct Russell’s reasoning is as follows: Suppose our logical system con-
tains A1, . . . , An as axioms. Suppose, further, that A1 happens to be a principle of deduction—in
other words, it functions as an inference rule as well as an axiom. Imagine we try to argue for
A1’s independence from A2, . . . , An by observing that attempts to prove A1 from A2, . . . , An
repeatedly fail. These attempts at a proof, let us suppose, are all attempts to prove a contra-
diction from the negation of A1 together with the other axioms. But when A1 is a “principle
of deduction” this procedure will not work. For in denying A1 for reductio we also deny the
soundness of the corresponding inference rule, so our repeated failure to prove a contradiction
may just be attributable to a weakening of the deductive power of the system, rather than to
the fact that A1 does not follow from the other axioms. So we cannot treat failure to prove a
contradiction on repeated occasions as non-demonstrative evidence that A1 is independent of
the other axioms.
If we grant Russell’s conception of a “principle of deduction” this argument is cogent. More-
over, it receives some support from the passage from the quotation from Russell 1992a discussed
in the previous note. For there Russell says that when a “rule of deduction” (i.e., “a principle
of deduction”) is not true we would not have a “correct deduction,” which seems to imply a
weakening in the system’s deductive strength.
Unfortunately, however, this reading’s fit with the key passage is imperfect. Russell says that
when an axiom is a principle of deduction and true, “the consequences that appear to follow
from the employment of an opposite principle will not really follow.” This seems to mean that
when we assume A1 false for reductio we will adopt another principle as an inference rule, and
use it to license inferences that are in fact not valid. So, in relying on these rules, we will run
the risk of obtaining false dependence results. But that means we will obtain false negatives for
independence, rather than false positives. (I am grateful to Brad Cokelet for impressing on me
the prima facie superior textual fit of this second reading).
70 This essay has benefited from detailed comments from: Jamie Tappenden, Jason Stanley,
James Levine, Michael Potter, Thomas Ricketts, Jim Joyce, Thony Gillies, Göran Sundholm,
Bernard Linsky, Benj Hellie, Jessica Wilson, Stacie Friend, Brad Cokelet, Josh Brown and Mike
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Caie. Special thanks to Jamie and Jason for reading countless drafts and providing an ongoing
conversation about these issues over a number of years. The essay has also benefited greatly from
a compendium of Russell’s remarks on logic compiled by Richard Cartwright and distributed
in his lectures on Russell at MIT in the mid-ninetees. It was my attendance at those fascinat-
ing lectures that first stimulated my interest in the present topic. Ancestors of the paper were
presented as talks at the University of Liverpool and at Northwestern University. I am most
grateful to all those who participated in these lively and (for me) fruitful discussions. The final
version benefited from some very helpful comments from an anonymous referee.
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———. (1995) From Dedekind to Gödel: Essays on the Development of the Foundations of Math-
ematics (Dortrecht, Kluwer).
Hunter, Geoffrey. (1971) Metalogic: An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order
Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press).
Hylton, Peter. (1980) “Russell’s substitutional theory,” Synthese, 45, 1–31.
———. (1990) Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Russell and the Universalist Conception of Logic 31
Kant, Immanuel. (1998) The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press).
Kripke, Saul. (2005). “Russell’s Notion of Scope,” Mind, volume 114, number 456, October,
2005, 1005–37.
Lackey, D., ed. (1973) Essays in Analysis (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.).
Landini, Gregory. (1996) “Logic in Russell’s Principles of Mathematics,” Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic, volume 37, number 4.
———. (1998) Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press).
Levine, James. (2001a) “On Russell’s vulnerability to Russell’s paradox,” History and Philosophy
of Logic, 22, 207–31.
———. (2001b) “Review of Gregory Landini’s Russell’s Hidden Substitutional Theory,” The
Philosophical Review, vol. 110, no. 1 (January), 138–41.
MacFarlane, John. (2002) “Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism,” The Philosophical Review,
vol. 111, no. 1, 25–65.
McGuinness, Brian, ed., (1984) Gottlob Frege, Collected Papers on Mathematics Logic, and
Philosophy. (Oxford: B. Blackwell).
McGuinness, Brian and von Wright, G. H. eds., (1995) Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge Letters
(Oxford: Blackwell).
Marsh, R. C., ed., (1988) Logic and Knowledge (London: Allen and Unwin).
Mellor, D. H. (1990) F. P. Ramsey: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Peano, Guiseppe. (1906) “Additione,” in Rivista di Matematica, 5th ser., volume 8, 143–57.
Potter, Michael. (2000) Reason’s Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic from Kant to Carnap
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
———. (forthcoming) The Notes on Logic (working title) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Proops, Ian. (2006) “Russell’s Reasons for Logicism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol.
44, no. 2, 267–92.
Quine, W. V. (1982) Methods of Logic, fourth edition (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press).
Ramsey, F. P. (1990) [1929]: “Mathematical Logic,” in D. H. Mellor, 1990, 225–44.
Ricketts, Thomas. (1986) “Objectivity and Objecthood: Frege’s Metaphysics of Judgement,” in
Frege Synthesized, ed. L. Haaperanta and J. Hintikka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel).
———. (1996) “Pictures, logic, and the limits of sense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus,” in Sluga
and Stern, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press) (59–99).
———. (1997) “Frege’s 1906 Foray into Metalogic,” Philosophical Topics, vol. 25, no 2, 169–88.
Russell, B. (1986) [1912]: The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
———. (1988a) [1901]: “The Logic of Relations,” in R. Marsh (1988), 3–38. First published in
French in Rivista di Matematica [Revue de Mathematiques], volume 7, 115–48, Turin,
1900–01.
———. (1988b) [1918–19]: “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” in Marsh, ed. (1988), 175–
281.
———. (1990) [1910]: with A. N. Whitehead, Principia Mathematica (to ∗56). (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press). Abbreviated as “Principia”.
———. (1992a) Logical and Philosophical Papers 1909–13, The Collected Papers of Bertrand Rus-
sell, Volume 6. Edited by John G. Slater with the assistance of B. Frohmann (London:
Routledge).
———. (1992b) Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Theory of Knowledge Manuscript, Elizabeth
Ramsden Eames, ed., in collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell (London: Routledge).
———. (1993a) [1914]: Our Knowledge of the External World (London: Routledge).
32 NOÛS
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